Social choice theory includes the study of voting methods. In the literature on social choice theory many methods exist, the main objective of all these methods is the determination of a good method. However, many of these methods give controversial results which often lead to disputes. It should also be noted that sometimes, regardless of the method used, there are people who are not ready to accept the results given by the ballot box. The ideal would be to find a method with good properties, because it seems that there are no completely satisfactory methods. Since the goal of a voting method is to reconcile several points of view into a general interest, one should focus on the properties. The geometric mean does not lead to a compensation of weak criteria by stronger ones as it is the case with the arithmetic mean. Indeed, by using the geometric mean, even if only one criterion is very weak and the others are very strong, a candidate may not be well ranked; moreover, assent voting is very well appreciated in the literature by many authors and also generates huge opportunities. This justifies our choice in this work to combine geometric mean and assent voting to develop a method with good properties.
Published in | Pure and Applied Mathematics Journal (Volume 10, Issue 6) |
DOI | 10.11648/j.pamj.20211006.11 |
Page(s) | 121-126 |
Creative Commons |
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited. |
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Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Science Publishing Group |
New Method, Innovative, Social Choice Theory
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APA Style
Zoïnabo Savadogo, Sougoursi Jean Yves Zaré, Wambie Zongo, Somdouda Sawadogo, Blaise Somé. (2021). New Innovative Method in the Field of Social Choice Theory. Pure and Applied Mathematics Journal, 10(6), 121-126. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.pamj.20211006.11
ACS Style
Zoïnabo Savadogo; Sougoursi Jean Yves Zaré; Wambie Zongo; Somdouda Sawadogo; Blaise Somé. New Innovative Method in the Field of Social Choice Theory. Pure Appl. Math. J. 2021, 10(6), 121-126. doi: 10.11648/j.pamj.20211006.11
AMA Style
Zoïnabo Savadogo, Sougoursi Jean Yves Zaré, Wambie Zongo, Somdouda Sawadogo, Blaise Somé. New Innovative Method in the Field of Social Choice Theory. Pure Appl Math J. 2021;10(6):121-126. doi: 10.11648/j.pamj.20211006.11
@article{10.11648/j.pamj.20211006.11, author = {Zoïnabo Savadogo and Sougoursi Jean Yves Zaré and Wambie Zongo and Somdouda Sawadogo and Blaise Somé}, title = {New Innovative Method in the Field of Social Choice Theory}, journal = {Pure and Applied Mathematics Journal}, volume = {10}, number = {6}, pages = {121-126}, doi = {10.11648/j.pamj.20211006.11}, url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.pamj.20211006.11}, eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.pamj.20211006.11}, abstract = {Social choice theory includes the study of voting methods. In the literature on social choice theory many methods exist, the main objective of all these methods is the determination of a good method. However, many of these methods give controversial results which often lead to disputes. It should also be noted that sometimes, regardless of the method used, there are people who are not ready to accept the results given by the ballot box. The ideal would be to find a method with good properties, because it seems that there are no completely satisfactory methods. Since the goal of a voting method is to reconcile several points of view into a general interest, one should focus on the properties. The geometric mean does not lead to a compensation of weak criteria by stronger ones as it is the case with the arithmetic mean. Indeed, by using the geometric mean, even if only one criterion is very weak and the others are very strong, a candidate may not be well ranked; moreover, assent voting is very well appreciated in the literature by many authors and also generates huge opportunities. This justifies our choice in this work to combine geometric mean and assent voting to develop a method with good properties.}, year = {2021} }
TY - JOUR T1 - New Innovative Method in the Field of Social Choice Theory AU - Zoïnabo Savadogo AU - Sougoursi Jean Yves Zaré AU - Wambie Zongo AU - Somdouda Sawadogo AU - Blaise Somé Y1 - 2021/11/27 PY - 2021 N1 - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.pamj.20211006.11 DO - 10.11648/j.pamj.20211006.11 T2 - Pure and Applied Mathematics Journal JF - Pure and Applied Mathematics Journal JO - Pure and Applied Mathematics Journal SP - 121 EP - 126 PB - Science Publishing Group SN - 2326-9812 UR - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.pamj.20211006.11 AB - Social choice theory includes the study of voting methods. In the literature on social choice theory many methods exist, the main objective of all these methods is the determination of a good method. However, many of these methods give controversial results which often lead to disputes. It should also be noted that sometimes, regardless of the method used, there are people who are not ready to accept the results given by the ballot box. The ideal would be to find a method with good properties, because it seems that there are no completely satisfactory methods. Since the goal of a voting method is to reconcile several points of view into a general interest, one should focus on the properties. The geometric mean does not lead to a compensation of weak criteria by stronger ones as it is the case with the arithmetic mean. Indeed, by using the geometric mean, even if only one criterion is very weak and the others are very strong, a candidate may not be well ranked; moreover, assent voting is very well appreciated in the literature by many authors and also generates huge opportunities. This justifies our choice in this work to combine geometric mean and assent voting to develop a method with good properties. VL - 10 IS - 6 ER -