Study on Interest Game and Allocation Mechanism in Allocation of China’s Environmental Management Right

Meng Tao

doi:doi:10.11648/j.ijepp.20170504.12

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Study on Interest Game and Allocation Mechanism in Allocation of China’s Environmental Management Right

Meng Tao

Published in International Journal of Environmental Protection and Policy (Volume 5, Issue 4)

Received: 13 April 2017 Accepted: 5 May 2017 Published: 5 July 2017

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Abstract

China’s environmental protection issue is increasingly highlighted with its rapid economic development. Related theories and practices demonstrate that both market and government failures exist in the environmental governance issue. At present, the core issue for China’s environmental governance is the allocation of environmental management right between governments, non-governmental organizations, enterprises, and communities. The local governments function as the link among them. It is very important to study the Central Government’s mechanism design in the allocation of environmental management right and the local governments’ behavior choice. This paper analyzes the principal-agent relation between both the Central Government and local governments, and studies their selections respectively in symmetric and asymmetric information conditions. By analyzing, it holds that in the case of satisfying a certain constraint conditions, the Central Government can ensure that local governments can comply with more strictly the environmental regulation mechanism by giving them an excessive payment, whereas the local governments should truthfully select an optimal effort level.

Published in	International Journal of Environmental Protection and Policy (Volume 5, Issue 4)
DOI	10.11648/j.ijepp.20170504.12
Page(s)	54-60
Creative Commons	This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright	Copyright © The Author(s), 2017. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Environmental Management Right, Interest Game, Allocation Mechanism Design

References

[1]	Biemann, Frank (2002). The Case for A World Environment Organization. Environment Science and Policy for Sustainable Development, 43 (9): 22-31.
[2]	Whalley, Hohn, Ben Zissimos (2002). An Internalization-Based World Environmental Organization. The World Economy, 25 (5): 619-642.
[3]	Z Hu, C Wei，L Yao，C Li，Z Zeng (2016). Integrating Equality and Stability to Resolve Water Allocation Issues with A Multiobjective Bilevel Programming Model. Journal of Water Resources Planning & Management, 142 (7): 1-12.
[4]	A Dinar, RE Howitt (1997). Mechanisms for Allocation of Environmental Control Cost: Empirical Tests of Acceptability and Stability. Journal of Environmental Management, 49 (2): 183-203.
[5]	EJ Duckett (2006). Environmental Management Right-Sizing Environmental Controls. Chemical Engineering Progress, 102 (6): 43-47.
[6]	Edeltraud Guenther, Jan Endrikat1, Thomas W. Guenther (2016). Environmental Management Control Systems: A Conceptualization and A Review of The Empirical Evidence. Journal of Cleaner Production, 136 (10): 147-171.
[7]	Arika Virapongsea, Samantha Brooksc, Elizabeth Covelli Metcalfd (2016). A Social-Ecological Systems Approach for Environmental Management. Journal of Environmental Management, 178 (9): 83-91.
[8]	Marilyn T. Lucas, Thomas G. Noordewier (2016). Environmental Management Practices and Firm Financial Performance: The Moderating Effect of Industry Pollution-Related Factors. International Journal of Production Economics, 175 (5): 2 4-34.
[9]	Ralph Mastromonaco (2015). Do Environmental Right-to-Know Laws Affect Markets? Capitalization of Information in The Toxic Release Inventory. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 71 (5): 54-70.
[10]	OECD (2001). Towards Sustainable Development. Environmental Indicators, Paris.
[11]	Matthew Van Essena, Mark Walker (2017). A Simple Market-Like Allocation Mechanism for Public Goods. Games and Economic Behavior, 101 (1): 6-19.
[12]	Guang-Ming Shia, Jin-Nan Wangb, Bing Zhangc, Zhe Zhangd, Yong-Liang Zhang (2016). Pollution Control Costs of a Transboundary River Basin: Empirical Tests of The Fairness and Stability of Cost Allocation Mechanisms Using Game Theory. Journal of Environmental Management, 177 (7): 145-152.

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APA Style

Meng Tao. (2017). Study on Interest Game and Allocation Mechanism in Allocation of China’s Environmental Management Right. International Journal of Environmental Protection and Policy, 5(4), 54-60. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijepp.20170504.12

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ACS Style

Meng Tao. Study on Interest Game and Allocation Mechanism in Allocation of China’s Environmental Management Right. Int. J. Environ. Prot. Policy 2017, 5(4), 54-60. doi: 10.11648/j.ijepp.20170504.12

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AMA Style

Meng Tao. Study on Interest Game and Allocation Mechanism in Allocation of China’s Environmental Management Right. Int J Environ Prot Policy. 2017;5(4):54-60. doi: 10.11648/j.ijepp.20170504.12

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@article{10.11648/j.ijepp.20170504.12,
  author = {Meng Tao},
  title = {Study on Interest Game and Allocation Mechanism in Allocation of China’s Environmental Management Right},
  journal = {International Journal of Environmental Protection and Policy},
  volume = {5},
  number = {4},
  pages = {54-60},
  doi = {10.11648/j.ijepp.20170504.12},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijepp.20170504.12},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijepp.20170504.12},
  abstract = {China’s environmental protection issue is increasingly highlighted with its rapid economic development. Related theories and practices demonstrate that both market and government failures exist in the environmental governance issue. At present, the core issue for China’s environmental governance is the allocation of environmental management right between governments, non-governmental organizations, enterprises, and communities. The local governments function as the link among them. It is very important to study the Central Government’s mechanism design in the allocation of environmental management right and the local governments’ behavior choice. This paper analyzes the principal-agent relation between both the Central Government and local governments, and studies their selections respectively in symmetric and asymmetric information conditions. By analyzing, it holds that in the case of satisfying a certain constraint conditions, the Central Government can ensure that local governments can comply with more strictly the environmental regulation mechanism by giving them an excessive payment, whereas the local governments should truthfully select an optimal effort level.},
 year = {2017}
}

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TY  - JOUR
T1  - Study on Interest Game and Allocation Mechanism in Allocation of China’s Environmental Management Right
AU  - Meng Tao
Y1  - 2017/07/05
PY  - 2017
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijepp.20170504.12
DO  - 10.11648/j.ijepp.20170504.12
T2  - International Journal of Environmental Protection and Policy
JF  - International Journal of Environmental Protection and Policy
JO  - International Journal of Environmental Protection and Policy
SP  - 54
EP  - 60
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2330-7536
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijepp.20170504.12
AB  - China’s environmental protection issue is increasingly highlighted with its rapid economic development. Related theories and practices demonstrate that both market and government failures exist in the environmental governance issue. At present, the core issue for China’s environmental governance is the allocation of environmental management right between governments, non-governmental organizations, enterprises, and communities. The local governments function as the link among them. It is very important to study the Central Government’s mechanism design in the allocation of environmental management right and the local governments’ behavior choice. This paper analyzes the principal-agent relation between both the Central Government and local governments, and studies their selections respectively in symmetric and asymmetric information conditions. By analyzing, it holds that in the case of satisfying a certain constraint conditions, the Central Government can ensure that local governments can comply with more strictly the environmental regulation mechanism by giving them an excessive payment, whereas the local governments should truthfully select an optimal effort level.
VL  - 5
IS  - 4
ER  -

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Author Information

Meng Tao

School of Public, Policy & Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China

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APA Style

Meng Tao. (2017). Study on Interest Game and Allocation Mechanism in Allocation of China’s Environmental Management Right. International Journal of Environmental Protection and Policy, 5(4), 54-60. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijepp.20170504.12

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ACS Style

Meng Tao. Study on Interest Game and Allocation Mechanism in Allocation of China’s Environmental Management Right. Int. J. Environ. Prot. Policy 2017, 5(4), 54-60. doi: 10.11648/j.ijepp.20170504.12

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AMA Style

Meng Tao. Study on Interest Game and Allocation Mechanism in Allocation of China’s Environmental Management Right. Int J Environ Prot Policy. 2017;5(4):54-60. doi: 10.11648/j.ijepp.20170504.12

Copy | Download

@article{10.11648/j.ijepp.20170504.12,
  author = {Meng Tao},
  title = {Study on Interest Game and Allocation Mechanism in Allocation of China’s Environmental Management Right},
  journal = {International Journal of Environmental Protection and Policy},
  volume = {5},
  number = {4},
  pages = {54-60},
  doi = {10.11648/j.ijepp.20170504.12},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijepp.20170504.12},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijepp.20170504.12},
  abstract = {China’s environmental protection issue is increasingly highlighted with its rapid economic development. Related theories and practices demonstrate that both market and government failures exist in the environmental governance issue. At present, the core issue for China’s environmental governance is the allocation of environmental management right between governments, non-governmental organizations, enterprises, and communities. The local governments function as the link among them. It is very important to study the Central Government’s mechanism design in the allocation of environmental management right and the local governments’ behavior choice. This paper analyzes the principal-agent relation between both the Central Government and local governments, and studies their selections respectively in symmetric and asymmetric information conditions. By analyzing, it holds that in the case of satisfying a certain constraint conditions, the Central Government can ensure that local governments can comply with more strictly the environmental regulation mechanism by giving them an excessive payment, whereas the local governments should truthfully select an optimal effort level.},
 year = {2017}
}

Copy | Download

TY  - JOUR
T1  - Study on Interest Game and Allocation Mechanism in Allocation of China’s Environmental Management Right
AU  - Meng Tao
Y1  - 2017/07/05
PY  - 2017
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijepp.20170504.12
DO  - 10.11648/j.ijepp.20170504.12
T2  - International Journal of Environmental Protection and Policy
JF  - International Journal of Environmental Protection and Policy
JO  - International Journal of Environmental Protection and Policy
SP  - 54
EP  - 60
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2330-7536
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijepp.20170504.12
AB  - China’s environmental protection issue is increasingly highlighted with its rapid economic development. Related theories and practices demonstrate that both market and government failures exist in the environmental governance issue. At present, the core issue for China’s environmental governance is the allocation of environmental management right between governments, non-governmental organizations, enterprises, and communities. The local governments function as the link among them. It is very important to study the Central Government’s mechanism design in the allocation of environmental management right and the local governments’ behavior choice. This paper analyzes the principal-agent relation between both the Central Government and local governments, and studies their selections respectively in symmetric and asymmetric information conditions. By analyzing, it holds that in the case of satisfying a certain constraint conditions, the Central Government can ensure that local governments can comply with more strictly the environmental regulation mechanism by giving them an excessive payment, whereas the local governments should truthfully select an optimal effort level.
VL  - 5
IS  - 4
ER  -

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